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GOVERNMENTAL BENEFITS CONDITIONED ON
THE RELINQUISHMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS
",... [O]n the one hand, [it is] the very basis of a free society,
that of the right of expression beyond the conventions of the day, and on
the other hand, the freedom of society from constitutionalcompulsion to
subsidize enterprise,whether in the world of matter or of mind. a
I. INTRODUCTION
Government subsidies, benefits, or grants, are subject to an inherent contradiction.2 The government has a right to define the limits of
their programs and the basis for awarding grants or subsidies. 3 Conversely, the government may not penalize individuals for exercising their
constitutional rights.4 Potential recipients of government grants have to
Hannegan v. Esquire Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 160 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
2

See infra note 3 (noting government's right to define programs); infra note 4 (ex-

plaining government may not penalize person for exercising Constitutional rights). For
the purposes of this paper, the term "benefits" includes subsidies, grants, tax breaks, or
any other case in which the government provides privilege to the people, including the
use of government property.
3
See NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587-88 (1998) (recognizing greater government latitude in spending than in regulation); Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v.
Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 669 (1998) (holding public broadcaster's decision to exclude candidate from debate reasonable); see also Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ.
of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 892 (1995) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500
U.S. 173 (1991) in holding that government may define its programs); Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (commenting that government may define programs created
with public appropriations); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977) (upholding Connecticut's right to limit Title X programs concerning abortions); Valezquez v. Legal
Servs. Corp., 164 F.3d 757, 768 (2d Cir. 1999) (upholding some limitations on government program for legal services); Legal Aid Servs. of Haw v. Legal Servs. Corp., 145
F.3d 1017, 1024 (9th Cir. 1998) (recognizing Congress' broad power to fund and define
programs).
4 See Finley, 524 U.S. at 600-01 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing government
may
not deny favors based on acceptability of speaker's views); Simon and Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115 (1991) (stating statutes
that financially burden speakers because of content inconsistent with First Amendment);
Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983) (acknowledging exer-
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meet the conditions or restrictions the government places on these programs or subsidies such as not speaking of or performing abortions. 5
These conditions and restrictions may infringe upon Constitutional rights
such as free speech.6
This note addresses how courts are dealing with this contradiction
of limiting while not penalizing and proposes several arguments supporting potential recipients. Section II reviews the history of how benefits are structured, the problems inherent in that structure, and several
factors that influence whether the benefit limitations are constitutional.,
Section III reviews the current trends of the Court by examining some
recent cases from the Supreme Court as well as the courts of appeals.8
Section IV proposes several arguments in favor of potential subsidy recipients.9 Finally, section V concludes with a look to the future of government benefit cases where the constitutionality of conditioned benefits
are raised.10

II. HISTORY
Government benefits exist in many forms, ranging from tax credits to direct monetary grants." Generally, the government is under no

cise of constitutional rights may not be basis for refusing recipient benefits); Maher, 432
U.S. at 487 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (commenting that infringement of rights occurs
when exercise of those rights is made more difficult); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593, 597 (1972) (forbidding government from denying benefit based on exercise of constitutional rights, especially speech); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963)
(holding government unlawfully required unemployment recipient to choose between
benefit and religion); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958) (commenting denial
of benefit or tax exemption because of speech acts as penalty for speech). Cf. Bella
Lewitzky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774, 784-85 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (explaining government subsidies cannot violate vagueness standards).
6 See infra note 16 (listing upheld conditions on
recipient's behavior).
' See infra notes 17, 18 (listing unconstitutional behavior restrictions).
7 See infra notes 11-42 and accompanying text.
a See infra notes 43-77 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 78-109 and accompanying text.
10
See infra notes 109 and accompanying text.
n See Rust, 500 U.S. at 200 (commenting government "subsidy" may be access to
government-owned property); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 368-69
(1984) (discussing funding provided for public broadcasting); Regan, 461 U.S. at 542
(1983) (recognizing tax exemptions and deductions as forms of government subsidies);
Hannegan, 327 U.S. at 151 (recognizing second class mailing privileges as subsidy);
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constitutional compulsion to create most benefits. 2 Scarcity of resources
mandate that the government exercise discretion when allocating benefits. 13 Moreover, the government is under no obligation to promote the
exercise of constitutional rights.14 The Court has recognized the government's right to define the limits of a benefit or program the government creates or funds. 15
In defining a program or benefit, the government mandates participatory restrictions and conditions. 6 Often, potential recipients do not
Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 795 (1st Cir.1976) (recognizing congressional funding of arts as subsidy).
12 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 201 (commenting government not under duty to fund activity simply because activity is constitutional right); Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S.
439, 450 (1991) (explaining government need not fund First Amendment rights); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) (opining
Due Process Clause of Constitution gives no right to government aid even if necessary
for life, liberty, or property interests when government is not entity depriving individuals); Regan, 461 U.S. at 549 (reaffirming constitutionality of legislature not subsidizing
fundamental rights); Maher,432 U.S. at 469 (clarifying government under no requirement to provide any medical services to poor); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S.
498, 515 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring) (rejecting notion rights not realized unless
subsidized). But see supra note 4 (citing denials equaling infringement); infra note 17
(listing unconstitutional limitations on subsidies).
13 See Finley, 524 U.S. at 585 (recognizing art funding
decisions require denying
most applications); Forbes, 523 U.S. at 674 (noting nature of broadcasting facility necessitates promotion of one view over another); Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 829 (recognizing government's necessity to limit forum); Rust, 500 U.S. at 194 (reasoning government funding of one program means discouraging alternative program); Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 237 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining
impossibility of according all speech protection against exclusion from subsidies);
Maher, 432 U.S. at 479 (reiterating competition for limited public funds justifies state's
right to make choices); Advocates for the Arts, 532 F.2d at 796 (suggesting use limits on
government property not applicable to art subsidies). But see supra note 4 (explaining
constitutional arguments against government denying funding).
14
See supra note 12 (discussing constitutional rights need not be funded); infra
note 15 (explaining government's right to define subsidies); infra note 16 (providing
examples of definitions on programs).
'6See supra note 3 (noting government's right to define programs); infra note 16
(listing limitations on benefits that were upheld); Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 512 (explaining tax system may limit exemptions for lobbying expenses). But see Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 517 (1958) (noting California court required conditions on grants
be reasonable).
" See NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. at 572 (upholding statute requiring NEA to consider decency and respect); Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666,
676 (1998) (recognizing public broadcaster's right of editorial discretion to exclude
candidate from televised debate); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 177 (1991) (upholding
Title X limitations on abortion counseling); Leathers, 499 U.S. at 453 (upholding gener-
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agree with these restrictions and regard them as penalties for, or barriers
to, the exercise of their constitutional rights.' 7 The central issue of government benefit cases is whether the limitation on the benefit unconstitutionally acts as a penalty on recipients for the exercise of their constitutional rights.' 8 The potential recipients argue: "but for my wanting to
ally applicable sales tax including cable but excluding print media); Regan v. Taxation
with Representation, 461 U.S. at 551 (1983) (noting tax code may deny exemption for
lobbying expenses); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 474, 466 (1977) (holding Connecticut may
choose to pay for child birth but not abortions); Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513 (allowing
tax code to exclude lobbying expenses from exemptions even if necessary for business);
Valezquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 164 F.3d 757, 759, 773 (2d Cir. 1999) (allowing some
restrictions in legal services grant); Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792,
798 (1st Cir. 1976) (affirming New Hampshire's right to deny art subsidy to magazine
for inclusion of filthy poem). But see supra note 4 (listing reasons restrictions may be
held unconstitutional); infra notes 17, 18 (listing benefits with unconstitutional conditions); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (noting benefit may not be denied
based on constitutionally infringing basis); Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146, 156
(1946) (commenting denial of mall use requires special grounds).
7
7 See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ.
of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 84546 (1995) (determining University's restriction on funding promotion of religion unconstitutional); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. 384,
394 (1993) (holding school not denying access to otherwise open building based on
expression of religious viewpoint); Simon and Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y.
State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 123 (1991) (criticizing statute requiring accused
or convicted criminal's publicity money to be held in escrow as against First Amendment); Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. at 234 (holding tax based on subject matter
of magazine violated First Amendment); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S.
364, 402 (1984) (finding ban on management of public broadcasting stations editorializing violated First Amendment); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546,
552 (1975) (noting city's denial of municipal theater for Hair was prior restraint); Perry,
408 U.S. at 598 (finding failure to renew state teacher's contract because of his criticism
violated First Amendment); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 405-06 (1963) (finding
denial of benefit unconstitutional because religious belief prohibited Saturday work);
Speiser, 357 U.S. at 528-29 (noting required oath to not overthrow government for tax
benefit unconstitutionally shifted burden of proof); Hannegan, 327 U.S. at 158 (condemning as censorship denial of second-class mailing privilege based on public good
determination); Valezquez, 164 F.3d at 772 (disallowing legal services restriction based
on viewpoint); Bella Lewitzy Dance Found. v. Froyhnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774, 783
(C.D. Cal.1991) (holding compelling grant recipients to sign non-obscenity certificate
vague and against First Amendment). But see supra note 3 (discussing government's
right to define programs); supra note 16 (noting examples of upheld limitations).
" See Simon and Schuster, 502 U.S. at 116-17 (characterizing Son of Sam escrow
mandate as burden on free speech); Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc v. Ragland, 481 U.S.
221, 227 (1987) (explaining discriminatory tax on press burdens First Amendment);
SoutheasternPromotions, Ltd., 420 U.S. at 557 n8. (suggesting city's refusal to allow
musical in municipal theater acted as warning to other theaters); Sherbert,374 U.S. at
404 (comparing denial of unemployment benefit to fine imposed for Saturday worship);
American Communications, CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1959) (noting indirect
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exercise my constitutional rights, I would receive this benefit."' 9 Further, "the government may not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional right."2 The government responds that it is not
required to grant any benefits. 21 Furthermore, the government relies on
precedent stating that it is allowed to regulate the behavior of recipients
acting within the scope of a government program or acting as speakers of
a government message. 2
In determining whether a condition on a benefit infringes on a
constitutionally protected right, the courts often examine whether there
was an alternate avenue through which the potential recipient could exercise that right.2 For example, could the potential recipient exercise the
discouragements have same coercive effects as fine or imprisonment); Speiser,357 U.S.
at 518 (contending tax exemption denial acted as penalty); Bella Lewitzky, 754 F. Supp.
at 780-83 (considering subsidy denial as injury and noting NEA denial impedes ability
for private funding). There is a fine line between when a denial is a penalty or just a
decision of Congress not to fund a right. See Speiser, 357 U.S. at 525 (noting fine line in
regulation of speech). Potential recipients who wish to make art outside the limits of a
subsidy are in the same position as if the government had offered no subsidy. Finley,
524 U.S. at 595 (Scalia, J., concurring). See also Rust, 500 U.S. at 202 (recognizing
failure to award benefit left recipient with same options as if there were no potential of
benefit); Arkansas Writer's Project Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 237 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (opining denial of benefit does not have coercive effect); Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297, 317, n.19 (1980)) (noting refusal to fund right without more is different
than penalty); Maher,432 U.S. at 475 (recognizing difference between not paying for
exercise of right and interference with right); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498,
513 (1959) (explaining Congress's lack of obligation to fund lobbying differs from penalty for lobbying). Cf supra note 12 (explaining government need not fund right merely
because right constitutional).
1
9See Simon and Schuster, 502 U.S. at 116 (observing state holding royalties from
book as unconstitutional disincentive on speech); Perry, 408 U.S. at 597 (listing benefits
Court held could not be declined based upon exercise of constitutional rights); Sherbert,
374 U.S. at 404 (recognizing denial of unemployment benefits is same as fine). But see
Regan, 461 U.S. at 546 (rejecting idea that right is not realized unless subsidized).
2 Regan, 461 U.S. at 545. Accord supra note 4 (explaining government may not
deny benefits for exercise of constitutional rights); supra notes 17, 18 (listing benefit
denials found to be unconstitutional). But see supra note 16 (describing benefit restrictions found constitutional).
21 See supra note 12 (discussing government need not fund constitutional rights).
22See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833
(1995) (recognizing government as speaker may mold message); Rust v. Sullivan, 500
U.S. 173, 192-93 (1991) (commenting government may make value choice to promote
childbirth over abortion); cf Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,476 (1977) (noting government' s broader power to encourage actions).
See NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 595-596 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining artists could make disrespectful art but society not obligated pay for it); Rust,
500 U.S. at 197 (clarifying unconstitutional conditions placed on speaker rather than on
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supposedly, restricted right outside the scope of the program, either
through affiliates or individually? 24 In cases where the recipients could
still exercise their rights in a manner unconnected with government
funding, the court found the benefit not to be conditional and thus the
restriction constitutional. 25
The courts have also examined the government's motives for
placing conditions on the receipt of subsidies. 26 If the government creprogram). It is permissible for a program to have limitations, however, those limitations
must be placed on the program and not on the speakers in a way that effects their behavior external to the subsidized program. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 196 (commenting Title X
grantees could still engage in abortion activity if outside scope of program); Regan v.
Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983) (clarifying case not about lobbying right but whether congress must subsidize lobbying); Valezquez v. Legal Servs.
Corp., 164 F.3d 757,765-768 (2d Cir. 1999) (discussing role of adequate alternate avenues when government restricts rights through benefits). Accord FCC v. League of
Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 400 (1984) (criticizing ban on editorializing for not allowing private funding of editorials); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (condemning denial of unemployment benefits left no choice but to forgo religious observance); Bella Lewitzky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774, 785 (C.D.
Cal. 1991) (arguing denial of NEA funding had effect of blocking access to alternate
channels). In some cases, having access to alternate avenues did not save the restrictions. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1974) (noting
government may not justify prior restraint because another forum is available); Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146, 150 (1946) (disallowing censorship of second-class mail
despite availability of first class mail).
24
See supra note 19 (discussing alternative avenues). This question concerns the
legal rather than the practical possibility. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (condemning majority for allowing viewpoint suppression because it only applied to those needing governmental assistance); Maher,432 U.S. at 483 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing restriction on abortion payments as form of financial coercion
imposed only on poor). "The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the
poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread." Maher,432 U.S. at
483 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 23 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Accord Regan, 461 U.S. at 553 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (commenting problem of silencing one speaker not solved by letting another speak).
2 See supra note 20 (observing relationship between alternate access and restriction); League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 400 (commenting restriction would be upheld if affiliates allowed to operate outside restriction); Rust, 500 U.S. at 197 (explaining
unconstitutional conditions operate on recipient rather than on subsidized program);
Maher,432 U.S. at 474 (limitation of abortion funding did not interfere with constitutional right); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959) (observing lobbying
was still allowed despite tax exemption restriction); Legal Aid Soc'y. of Haw. v. Legal
Servs. Corp., 145 F.3d 1017, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998) (commenting recipient could engage
in restricted activity through an affiliate).
2 See Simon and Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991) (stressing burdens on viewpoint speech will drive those viewpoints from marketplace); Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448-49, 452 (1991) (not-
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ates a program in an effort to hear citizens' diverse views, as opposed to
subsidizing speakers of the government's message, then the government's
motives are scrutinized more closely. 27 If, however, the government creates a program to promote one particular ideal, such as child birth, then
the demotion of an alternative ideal, such as abortion, is considered incident to2 the government deciding to fund one program over another program. 8
If speech or expression is restricted, courts examine whether the
government is infringing on the First Amendment.29 Typically, the fo-

ing government may not use subsidy to suppress ideas and thus distort marketplace);
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958) (explaining oath requirement for tax break
resulted in speech being limited); American Communications, Ass'n., CIO v. Douds, 339
U.S. 382, 402 (1950) (questioning whether aim of statute was suppression of dangerous
ideas); Hannegan, 327 U.S. at 158 (stating normative speech requirement against American ideology). Cf.Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835 (commenting danger of liberty lies in
state's ability to examine publications); Southeastern Promotions,Ltd., 420 U.S. at 563,
564 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part and concurring in result) (cautioning government
control of flow of ideas harms culture). But see Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532
F.2d 792, 798 (1st Cir. 1976) (suggesting danger of government skewing marketplace
reduced by subsidy allowing more speech).
27
See Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833
(1995) (distinguishing cases of government solicitation of private speech from cases in
which people speak for the government); Valezquez, 164 F.3d at 770-71 (questioning
whether range of case results may be due to government solicitation of private speech).
Legal Aid Soc'y of Haw., 145 F.3d at 1028 (commenting program for legal services not
intended to encourage private voices). The Federal and New Hampshire art funding
statutes give the promotion of private speech as one of the main purposes of the law,
however, in both cases, subjective decisions were upheld. See 20 U.S.C. § 954 (1990);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-A (1965); Finley, 524 U.S. at 585 (recognizing content
based decisions as inherent in arts funding); Advocate for the Arts, 532 F.2d at 795-96
(noting government's right to make case by case determination in arts funding).
See NEA v. Finley, 514 U.S. 569, 585 (1998) (recognizing choice of one applicant results in denial of another); Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523
U.S. 666, 694 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining impossibility of subsidizing all
speech); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. at 194 (justifying viewpoint discrimination because
program funding mutually exclusive); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 481 (noting government
funding discretion); Advocates for the Arts, 532 F.2d at 795 (noting denied applicant
cannot claim suppression just because another artist selected).
2 See Leathers, 499 U.S. at 448-49 (analogizing tax scheme targeting few speakers
to content based regulation because both distort idea marketplace); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 564 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in result) (explaining government ability to inhibit ideas harms culture); Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146, 157-58 (1946) (noting normative artistic requirements
contradict our system). But see Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (recognizing government's
necessity to limit forum); Maher, 432 U.S. at 479 (reiterating competition for limited
public funds justifies state making choices).
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rum test is employed when there are concerns that the government is
restricting speech through the denial of benefits. a

This test, however,

has an inherent flaw in that discrimination against certain viewpoints,
such as certain religious or political party ideology, may hide under the
3
guise of a limited public forum as opposed to an open public forum. '
This occurs when the Court examines the government's action of excluding a speaker as proof the forum was not open to the public, rather
than first examining the nature of the property to determine the forum
type.3 2
The Court has long noted that when the government is offering a
benefit, its criteria for awarding the benefit should be viewpointneutral. 3 Neutrality does not always occur, however, and two issues are
'* See Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 829 (discussing forum test's applicability to case
at bar); Forbes,523 U.S. at 675 (recognizing candidate debates require forum test). But
see Finley, 524 U.S. at 585-86 (distinguishing case at bar from prior forum cases). There
are three forums in the public forum test: Speakers have the most right in the public
forum, which are places traditionally held open for speech; speakers rights are more
limited in the limited public forum, where the space is being opened for discussion only
on particular topics; finally, speakers have the least rights in the non-public forum, which
is all other government property. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505
U.S. 672, 678-79 (1992). The InternationalSoc'yfor Krishna Consciousnesscourt
explains that public property traditionally used for expressive activity receives highest
scrutiny, public property opened for some of the public or for just some expressive activities has same review standard (sic), and other public property is subject to limited
review. Id. See also Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37,
45 (1983) (noting state must show compelling interest). The Perrycourt recognized that
a state must show compelling interest before restricting speech in places long devoted to
debate and expression. Id. The court also noted that in limited forums created by state,
any restriction must be narrowly drawn, and for all other public areas the state need only
be reasonable in its exclusion. Id. See also Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S.
298, 302 (1974) (explaining need to examine nature of forum and conflicting interests
for expression in public places).
S See InternationalSoc'y for Krishna Consciousness,Inc., 505 U.S. at 695, 697
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (pronouncing under majority's view any challenge fails
because Court examined government's actions rather than forum's status); United States
v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 741 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (commenting forum test
intended to preserve free speech used to exclude speech). Brennan also questioned the
forum test's continued use. Id. Accord Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 822 (1985) (commenting free speech should not depend on
grace of history or government).
32 See infra note 38 (explaining danger when government action used to determine
forum type).
3 See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828
(1995) (commenting government's inability to regulate speech on content is axiomatic);
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 392-93
(1993) (quoting Cornelius,473 U.S. at 806) (forbidding government from regulating
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noted when examining viewpoint neutrality.3 4 The first issue is whether
the government used objective criteria to determine the allotment of the
benefit. 35 The second issue, noted in dissents, is whether the government
actually complied with the objective criteria.36
The issues surrounding viewpoint neutrality become clouded
when the benefit is based on a subjective decision, such as artistic
merit.37 The subjective nature of art subsidies was used as justification
speech in manner favoring one viewpoint over another); Simon and Schuster v. Members
of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 126-27 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (reviewing prior cases that noted content regulations not allowed); Rust, 500 U.S. at
209 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n. of NY., 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980) (noting First Amendment prohibits content
based restrictions on viewpoints or entire topics); Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v.
Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229 (1987) (quoting Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92, 95 (1972)) (reiterating government cannot make content based restrictions); FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978) (commenting First Amendment requirement of government neutrality in marketplace of ideas). But see Simon and Schuster,
502 U.S. at 127 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (listing few categories which allow or consider
content based restrictions). These categories include obscenity, defamation, incitement,
or imminent danger. Id.
I See supra note 31 (discussing dangers of forum test); infra note 35 (noting need
for government neutrality). See also Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 751 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 825) (criticizing catch-22 of exclusion from forum
proves forum is limited public forum); Int'l Soc'yfor Krishna Consciousness,505 U.S.
at 695 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (criticizing lack of objective criteria requirement in
determining government's designated purpose for property). See also International
Soc'yfor Krishna Consciousness,505 U.S. at 695, 697 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (criticizing analyzing government's actions rather than forum's status causes anything to fail).
" See Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 839 (noting neutrality respected when government
follows neutral criteria); Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130,
132-33 (1992) (cautioning against government licensing officials with too much discretion); Leathers v Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 464 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983)) (noting government
properly selectively subsidizing speech according to content-neutral criteria may promote public good); PacificaFound., 438 U.S. at 770 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing
absence of limits on the FCC's power to censor); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v.
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975) (detailing prior cases condemnation of lack of clear
and definite standards); Lehman, 418 U.S. at 303 (commenting policies concerning access to advertising on city buses could not be arbitrary or capricious). But see Advocates

for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 796 (1st Cir. 1976) (noting absence of neutrality
tradition in public subsidization of speech activities).
T
See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 686 n.6 (1998)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (detailing how AETC did not exclude all who failed station's

own criteria).
3

7 See

NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 559, 586 (1998) (explaining Congress cannot legislate with clarity on subjective grants such as excellence or merit); Advocates for the

Arts, 532 F.2d at 796 (noting judgement requirement in subjective subsidies like art).
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in upholding additional criteria that specifically directed decency and
respect for American beliefs to be weighed in awarding art subsidies. 38
Similar difficulties occur when the government acts as a broadcaster and
thus has its own constitutional right to editorial discretion which necessarily entails subjective determinations. 3
In addition to the considerations described above, there are often
peculiar factors to a case that impact judicial decisions. 40 For example,
different topics garner more First Amendment protection than others.4 '
Sometimes the nature of the benefit itself requires more subjectivity or
restrictions than other benefits. 42 Both of these variations mean counsel
would be well advised to know the current trends of the Court and what
arguments the Court currently accepts.

But see Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146, 157 (1946) (noting art changes from generation to generation, and forcing conformance against our system).
" See Finley, 524 U.S. at 590 (noting new decency and respect consideration
merely adds imprecise consideration to already imprecise award).
" See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 674 (recognizing necessity of editorial discretion by
public broadcasters). But see Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of the Univ. Va., 515
U.S. 819, 835 (1995) (cautioning against danger of government evaluating publications
to determine if they meet government ideal); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 766
(1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (contending Court's decision allowed majority to keep
protected message from minority); Southeastern Promotions,Ltd., 420 U.S. at 564
(Douglas, J., dissenting in part and concurring in result) (noting government content
discretion promotes censorship).
4, See

infra notes 41, 42 (providing examples of factors such as topic and nature of

benefit).
See Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271-72 (1971) (declaring campaigns for political office have highest constitutional protection); Valezquez v. Legal
Servs. Corp., 164 F.3d 757, 771 (2d Cir. 1999) (opining legal arguments worthy of
greater First Amendment protection than abortion counseling or indecent art); Chandler
v. Georgia Pub. Telecomm. Comm'n, 917 F.2d 486, 490 (11 th Cir. 1990) (Clark, J.,
dissenting) (advocating political debate should get highest First Amendment protection).
42
See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998)
41

(noting nature of broadcasting facility necessitates promotion of one viewpoint over
another); Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994) (finding broadcasts
are principle way people get information); CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 401, (1980)
(White, J., dissenting) (quoting Report and Order: Commission Policy in Enforcing Section 312 (a) (7) of the Communications Act, 68 F.C.C. 2d 1079, 1087-88 (1978)) (decaring political broadcasting as basic element necessary to broadcasting's public interest
requirement); Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 796 (1st Cir. 1976)
(suggesting use limitations on government property not applicable to art subsides).
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III. THE CURRENT TREND

The current trend of the Supreme Court is to rule against potential
recipients and thus often overrule the courts of appeals. 43 Furthermore,
these denials are based on a combination of several arguments, including
denial of the restriction acting as a penalty, denial of improper motive of
the government, denial of non-viewpoint neutrality, considerations of the
government's role and incidentally, the subject matter of the limited
right." At the same time, dissenting opinions in these cases argue that
the majority was cursory in its analysis. 45
One recent government benefits case considered whether the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) could take into consideration decency and the diverse beliefs and values of the American public when
making award decisions." The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found the new consideration void for vagueness, and that the statute
utilized viewpoint discrimination on a "traditional sphere of free expres-

sion," the NEA. 47 The court of appeals also noted the government,
through the NEA, solicited private speech and was not speaking its own
message.4

4 See Finley v NEA, 100 F.3d 671,683-84 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd NEA v. Finley,
524 U.S. 569, 573 (1998); Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 93 F.3d 497,
500 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666,
669, 672 (1998).
"See Finley, 524 U.S. at 595 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting recipients could still
make indecent or offensive art outside program); id. at 587 (explaining government did
not misuse guideline to suppress ideas); iaL at 583-84 (ruling group decision excludes
possibility of supporting single viewpoint); id. 587-88 (commenting government may do
more as patron than as sovereign); Forbes,523 U.S. at 682 (noting jury did not find
state-owned television station tried to suppress voice); id. at 675 (recognizing candidate
debates as different from other broadcasting and thus requiring viewpoint neutrality); id
at 676-79 (discussing rights of government as property owner to limit speech).
"See infra notes 54-59 (discussing the Finley dissent); infra notes 70-77 (discussing the Forbesdissent).
"See Finley, 524 U.S. at 572-733.
47 ld. at 579 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) (explaining ruling
of appellate court). See also Finley v. NEA, 100 F.3d 671,674 (9th Cir. 1996) rev'd
NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (affirming district court's summary judgement).
" Finley v. NEA, 100 F.3d at 682. But see Finley, 524 U.S. at 586 (quoting Rosenbergers v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (distinguishing art funding from other subsidies because government encouraging only aesthetically
pleasing views).
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The Supreme Court reversed and upheld the new statute, noting it
was not view-point based and that it was a consideration rather than an
outright ban.49 Since the statute was a consideration and not an outright
ban, it was not considered a penalty upon those who wished to create
indecent or disrespectful art, as they could still do so and technically
receive a grant. 50 As in other government benefit cases, the Court reaffirmed the government's right to fund selectively. 5' The Court explained
that when the government is acting as a patron, it has more latitude to set
restrictions than when it is acting as a sovereign imposing criminal sanctions. 52 The Court admitted the new mandate "adds some
imprecise con53
process.
selection
subjective
already
an
to
siderations
The dissent in NEA v. Finley54 criticized the depth of the majority's reasoning.55 While the majority noted that the new decency and
respect standard was merely a consideration, the dissent explained that
the NEA was aware funding was jeopardized and would not risk further
loss by funding disrespectful or indecent art.56 Similarly, the dissent
noted artists would not risk denial of funding by creating such art.57 Additionally, the dissent criticized the Court's failure to adequately consider
the long-standing rule against viewpoint discrimination especially since
the intent of the forum was to encourage free expression. 58 Furthermore,
the government motive for censoring speech was transparent, since the

Finley, 524 U.S. at 587 (noting consideration applied in viewpoint neutral
manner); id. at 581 (explaining provision was consideration and different from outright
ban).
Id. at 588 (suggesting consideration would not cause artists to stray from any
topics). But see Finley, 524 U.S. at 589 (recognizing some artists may feel compelled to
conform speech).
"See id. at 588 (noting government's right to set spending to fund one ideal over
another). See also note 28 (explaining mutual exclusivity of government funding).
52See Finley, 524 U.S. at 587-88 (commenting government role effects power).
49See

3Finley, at

590 (reviewing new mandate).

524 U.S. at 569 (1998).
See supra notes 56-59 (discussing dissent of Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998)).
Finley, 524 U.S. at 609 (Souter, J., dissenting) (commenting NEA aware of
Congressional intent). See also note 18 (referencing Bella Lewitzky Dance Found. v.
Froyhnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774 (C.D. Cal. 1991)).
17Finley, 514 U.S. at 621 (Souter J., dissenting) (explaining artists
would not risk
funding loss). See also supra note 14 (referencing Bella Lewitzky).
5Finley,
524 U.S. 569, 606 (1998) (Souter J., dissenting) (noting statute obviously
viewpoint based).
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consideration came after several failed attempts at outright bans of constitutionally protected indecent and disrespectful art.5 9
The court of appeals in Valezquez v. Legal Services Corp.6 offered
an explanation for the ruling in Finley, as well as an explanation for the
general atmosphere of conflicting decisions. 6' The Valezquez court noted
different topics receive different levels of protection. 62 Indecent and
disrespectful art has never enjoyed a high level of protection, and the
court of appeals suggested this may explain why the Supreme Court did
not view the NEA limitation with the outrage that other subject matter
limitations may invoke.63
Only one year earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court examined whether
a state owned broadcaster was required to include all candidates in its
televised campaign debates.6 The court of appeals found the candidate
debates were a limited public forum which allowed the government to
exclude speakers. 65 The limitation was partially based on the government owned station's view of the candidates' political viability, a criteria
that was too subjective in the view of the appellate court."6 The court of
appeals concluded the government made a good faith journalistic decision to exclude the candidate. 67 This case was different, however, because the decision was not made by independent journalists but by the

" Finley, 524 U.S. at 603 (Souter J., dissenting) (articulating restrictive intent of
new NEA legislation).
"*Valezquez v. Legal Services Corp., 164 F.3d 757, 759 (2d Cir. 1999).
'Id.

See supra note 41 (discussing different levels of protection for different types of
speech); Valezquez, 164 F.3d at 771 (arguing legal services are closer to First Amendment than indecent art).
"Valezquez, 164 F.3d at 771. Cf. Simon and Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127 (1991) (Kennedy. J., concurring) (listing categories where Court allows content based restrictions; obscenity, defamation,
incitement, or imminent danger). See also supra note 37 (noting different levels of protection different types of speech receive).
" See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes 523 U.S. 666, 669 (1998)
(outlining third party's candidates political debate access).
" See Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 93 F.3d 497, 503 (8th Cir.
1996) (determining forum type of televised debates).
" Id. at 500 (agreeing with candidate on subjectivity of denial).
' See Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n., 93 F.3d at 505 (explaining
while decision in good faith government still one making decision).
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government
and thus there was no way to oversee these subjective deci68
sions.
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals in Arkansas
Educational Television Commission v. Forbes.69 The Court held that
while candidates were entitled to First Amendment protections, public
broadcasters, who also had First Amendment rights, were allowed to
exercise viewpoint-neutral journalistic discretion in excluding a candidate from the debate. 70 The Supreme Court, unlike the appellate court,
found the debate was a non-public forum and thus the exclusion need
only be reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.' Once determining the forum
was non-public, the Court concluded the government station made a
viewpoint neutral and reasonable journalistic decision in excluding the
candidate because of his
disorganization, lack of financial support, and
72
lack of newsworthiness.
The dissent in Arkansas EducationalTelevision Conmmission criticized the majority for the same reason as the dissent in Finley, specifically, that the Court did not fully examine the facts.7 3 The dissent provided examples of the lack of consistent standards when deciding who
may appear in the debates. 74 For example, some democrat and republican party candidates who failed to meet the supposed objective criteria of
the government station participated in the debate, while the third party
candidate was excluded when he failed to meet the criteria.75 The dissent
also pointed out that the excluded candidate had a strong political back-

"See id. at 505 (noting impossibility of protecting First Amendment from subjective exercise of government power).
" Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (finding
government's decision to exclude candidate reasonable).
70
See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 669, 674-75 (explaining public broadcaster's speech
rights). See also supra note 39 (discussing government's own constitutional rights).
71 See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 680 (explaining debate was neither open all persons
nor
open to all candidates); supra notes 29-31 (discussing forum test); supra notes 33-36
(noting requirement of viewpoint neutrality).
n See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 682 (listing reasons Forbes excluded). See also supra
note 71 (noting forum test and viewpoint neutrality).
See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 684-686 (criticizing criteria as lacking standards and ad
hoc). See also notes 56-59 (discussing dissent in NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998)).
74See infra note 76 (describing anomalies in candidate selection).
75
Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 686 n.5 (1998)
(listing democratic and republican candidates who should have been excluded by station
and were not).
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ground and the debate may have impacted the resulting election.76 The
dissent concluded that precedents should be observed and government
should be required to define and apply objective
criteria in an area as
7
important as "stag[ing] candidate debates."

IV. ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF POTENTIAL RECIPIENTS
Additional government subsidy cases will inevitably come before
the Supreme Court as the Second Circuit has already predicted. 78 A staple argument in government subsidy or aid cases is that the criteria for
awarding the benefit is not viewpoint neutral. 79 When the government
uses non-viewpoint neutral criteria, it sends the message "pariahs need
not apply."'' 0
The argument that the outsider deserves equal protection needs to
be carefully argued and explained. 8 ' The first step is to define the forum
type. 2 After the forum type is established, the criteria for determining
admission into the forum should be examined. 3 If the forum and the
limitations are not defined in the order of forum type first and limitations
second, then the limitations may be used to define the forum.8" If the
forum is defined by the limitations, then almost any forum may be de-

7'Forbes,

date).

523 U.S. at 684-85 (explaining political importance to excluded candi-

DId. at 695.

7sSee Valezquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 164 F.3d 757,776 (2d Cir. 1999) (Jacobs,
J., dissenting) (commenting split among appellate court decisions may indicate impending Supreme Court resolution).
"'See supra notes 33-36 (discussing viewpoint neutrality considerations). Cf. supra notes 30-31 (discussing forums' impact on neutrality).
" Chicago Acorn, SEIU v. Metropolitan Pier and Exposition Auth., 150 F.3d 695,
699 (7th Cir.1998). See supra note 18 (detailing how restrictions can penalize speech);
supra note 26 (warning government should not drive ideas out of marketplace of ideas);
supra note 29 (listing First Amendment concerns when government limits speech); supra
notes 31-33 (explaining objective criteria and correlative problems).
"See infra note 80-85 (describing forum test).
' See supra note 30 (explaining forum types and considerations of each); notes 31,
34 (noting dangers of forum test if limitations are used to define forum).
See supra note 30 (explaining forum types and the considerations of each); notes
31, 34 (noting dangers of forum test if limitations are used to define forum).
" See supra note 30 (explaining forum types and considerations of each); notes 31,
34 (noting dangers of forum test if limitations are used to define forum).
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fined as a limited public forum or a non public forum due to its limited
access.8 5 The result is the limitations on the subsidy will be viewed with
lowered scrutiny by the courts.86
A second subsidy case argument is the denial of a subsidy or
benefit acts as a penalty on the potential recipient for the exercise of his
or her constitutional rights.8 7 This includes arguments that potential recipients are denied monies or benefits because of their viewpoints on a
topic. 88 The success of this argument depends on the application of the
restriction to the applicant's life outside the program.8 9 In explaining this
issue, counsel should contend how the conditions on the money extend
beyond the subsidized program to external aspects of the recipient's
life. 90 Further, counsel should argue the subsidized activity can not be
separated from the recipient's other business. 91 The limitation acting as a
penalty argument has not always been successful and courts are still refining the elements of this argument.9
Another argument counsel may bring before the court is based on
the government's motives. 93 The argument contends that the government
is attempting to censor thought and skew the marketplace of ideas.9 As
discussed in many decisions concerning this argument, attorneys must be
careful to know the capacity in which the government is acting. 95 In
"See supra note 30 (explaining forum types and considerations of each); notes 31,
34 (noting dangers of forum test if limitations are used to define forum).
86See supra note 30 (describing different levels of scrutiny for each forum).
See supra notes 17-20 (listing various restrictions considered penalties). But see
note 18 (listing contrary rulings finding various restrictions not penalties).
" See supra notes 17-19 (listing unconstitutional limitations).
0 See supra notes 17, 23, 25 (detailing how limitations must be placed on program
and not on speaker). Cf. supra note 24 (criticizing how rationale of limitations on programs operates only against poor).
90See supra notes 17, 23, 25 (detailing how limitations must be placed on program
and not on speaker). Cf. supra note 24 (criticizing how rationale of limitations on programs operates only against poor).
" See supra notes 17, 23, 25 (identifying need to allow affiliates to engage in prohibited activities).
2See
supra note 23 (noting some restrictions failed despite alternate avenues). Cf.
supra note 24 (explaining alternate avenues argument treats poor disparately).
" See supra notes 26-28 (discussing improper government motives); note 33 (noting government decisions must be neutral); note 39 (warning of danger of censorship).
"See supra notes 26-28 (discussing improper government motives); note 33 (noting government decisions must be neutral); note 39 (warning of danger of censorship).
" See supra notes 24, 35 (explaining when government may influence ideas). Accord supra note 23 (explaining impossibility of subsidizing all potential recipients).
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some cases, the government is permitted to influence the market place of
ideas, for example, when it is speaking. 96
The censorship argument ties in closely with the first of two considerations in determining which types of subsidy cases to bring to court,
specifically, the consideration of the role of the government. 97 If the
government is acting as a speaker, it has a right to free speech and may
influence the market place of ideas. 98 If the government is acting as sovereign, it is severely limited in its allowable speech restriction." If,
however, the government is acting as a patron, then, the standards are
more ambiguous and the above arguments of censorship, penalties, and
viewpoint neutrality apply.1°° Courts scrutinize the government's actions
more closely when the government acts as sovereign, or does not have its
own constitutional rights which often make these constitutional challenges more successful for the recipient. 01
The second consideration pertains to the subject matter of the
case.' °2 Ironically, counsel representing a potential recipient's free expression may wish to censor.1°3 As noted above, different types of
speech and different constitutional rights receive different levels of pro05
tection. t °4 The court of appeals in Valezquez v. Legal Serv. Corp.

9See
supra note 3 (detailing government's right to define its programs); supra
notes 13, 29 (explaining effect of scarce money and resources); supranote 22 (noting
government may mold message when it is speaker); infra notes 98-101 (discussing role
of government). Accord supra note 27 (listing different subsidy case results).
See supra notes 24, 35 (discussing effect of government's role).
See supra note 3 (noting government's right to define programs); notes 22, 27,
24 (discussing different considerations in which government solicits private voices); note
39 (listing situations in which government has constitutional rights).
" See supra note 17 (listing unconstitutional restrictions); supra note 26 (warning
government may not skew marketplace of ideas); supra note 33 (commenting government must be viewpoint neutral except for specific topic areas).
"0,See supra note 13 (noting government cannot subsidize all recipients); supra

note 16 (listing allowed limitations); supra note 17 (listing unconstitutional restrictions);
supranote 26 (warning government may not skew marketplace of ideas); supra note 33
(commenting government must be viewpoint neutral except for specific topic areas).
,1 See supra note 17 (listing unconstitutional restrictions); supra note 18 (explaining denial is different than penalty); supranote 26 (warning government may not
skew marketplace of ideas); supra note 33 (commenting government must be viewpoint
neutral except for specific topic areas).
'See supra notes 25-35 (discussing effect of subject matter on success in court).
"' See supra note 41 (explaining different levels of protection for speech); supra
note 42 (explaining some subsidies are different by nature).

'" See supra note 37 (explaining different levels of protection for speech).
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questioned whether the sexual and offensive nature of the art involved in
the Finley case were not a factor in the Court's denial of relief. 1°6 The
same court then lauded the case at bar, Valezquez, because it concerned
speech involving legal services. 10 7 Note, though, in Rust v. Sullivan,'os
that the Supreme Court did not grant relief in a case involving medical
services, and has not ruled on Valezquez, involving legal services.1 9

V. CONCLUSION
Government subsidy cases are an evolving area of law that at
least one case has noted will inevitably be raised in the Supreme Court
again for further clarification. In some decisions in which facial challenges were brought, the Court noted the need for applied challenges
rather than facial challenges before they would examine the law. Counsel bringing an applied challenge should be prepared to show how the
limitation is a penalty, how the government's motives are suspect, that
the role of the government is as sovereign, that the speech in question is
protected and that the limitation is not viewpoint neutral.
A lot of confusion exists in this area, with split decisions in the
courts of appeals and the Supreme Court's recent overturning trend. The
lower courts are also calling for more definitive explanations of the circumstances in which the government may limit its programs and/or subsidies which impacts an applicant's constitutional speech. Precedent has
been less tolerable toward government being able to influence the marketplace of ideas by offering a benefit to one recipient and not another.
Recent cases have given the government more discretion when awarding
benefits and subsidies.
If this confusion remains, the chilling effect could decrease the
amount of speech. The confusion can also limit the opportunities to
speak or incentives to speak. If the government is uncertain whether it
lOS

164 F.3d 757 (1999).

Valezquez v. Legal Serv. Corp., 164 F.3d 757, 771 (2d Cir. 1999). See also supra notes 37-38 (listing examples of different subjects treated differently).
'"See
supra note 102 (noting the Valezquez, 164 F.3d 757 (1999) decision).
I 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
'o' See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 202-03 (1991) (declining to find restriction
on abortions or speech on abortions as infringement of doctor-patient relationship);
Valezquez, 164 F.3d at 759 (determining whether subsidy of legal services could be
restricted).
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can limit the use of its money or programs, the government may choose
to not confer any benefits rather than fund activities or speech it does not
support. In either scenario, society loses.
VictoriaRebecca Whelan

